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Abstract
To a large extent, the systemic importance of financial institutions is related to the topology of financial liability networks.
In this work we reconstruct and analyze the – to our knowledge – largest financial network that has been studied up to
now. This financial liability network consists of 51,980 firms and 796 banks. It represents 80.2% of total liabilities towards
banks by firms and all interbank liabilities from the entire Austrian banking system. We find that firms contribute to
systemic risk in similar ways as banks do. In particular, we identify several medium-sized banks and firms with total
assets below 1 bln. EUR that are systemically important in the entire financial network. We show that the notion of
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) or global and domestic systemically important banks (G-SIBs or
D-SIBs) can be straightforwardly extended to firms. We find that firms introduce slightly more systemic risk than banks.
In Austria in 2008, the total systemic risk of the interbank network amounts to only 29% of the total systemic risk of the
entire financial network, consisting of firms and banks.
Keywords: credit network, systemic importance, bank-firm relationships, interbank network, systemic risk, financial
regulation, contagion
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 was sparked by the col-
lapse of a relatively small – now famous – investment bank
and propagated through the financial system, bringing the
world financial system to the brink of collapse. Through
interrelationships between the financial and the real econ-
omy, the financial crisis spread quickly and was followed
by a global economic downturn, the Great Recession. Po-
tentially, also the opposite could happen: a financial crisis
could originate in the real economy and spread to the finan-
cial system, making the study of interrelationships between
the financial and the real economy more important than
ever.
In response to the financial crisis, the Basel III framework
recognizes systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) and, in particular, global and domestic systemically
important banks (G-SIBs or D-SIBs) and recommends in-
creased capital requirements for them – the so called “SIFI
surcharges” (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). In
this context several network-based measures that identify
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systemically important financial institutions have been pro-
posed and applied recently (Battiston et al., 2012; Markose
et al., 2012; Billio et al., 2012; Thurner and Poledna, 2013;
Poledna and Thurner, 2016; Leduc et al., 2017; Poledna
et al., 2017). These approaches bear the notion of the
systemic importance of a financial institution within a fi-
nancial network and rely on network centrality or on closely
related measures.
These network-based approaches typically work well in
small financial networks like banking networks with a rela-
tively small number of financial institutions, usually less
than a thousand. A serious disadvantage of centrality
measures is, however, that the corresponding value for a
particular institution has no clear interpretation as a mea-
sure for expected losses. A solution that solves this problem
is the so-called “DebtRank”, a recursive method, suggested
by Battiston et al. (2012), which quantifies the systemic
importance of financial institutions in terms of losses that
they would contribute to the total loss in case of a default.
Since data on financial networks is hard to obtain out-
side central banks and is typically only available for small
banking networks, there have also been several attempts to
quantify systemic importance of institutions without the
explicit knowledge of the underlying networks (Adrian and
Brunnermeier, 2011; Acharya et al., 2012; Brownlees and
Engle, 2012; Huang et al., 2012).
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These developments have spurred research on financial
networks. Driven by data availability, research on financial
networks has mainly focused on default contagion: mostly,
on direct lending networks between financial institutions
(Upper and Worms, 2002; Boss et al., 2004, 2005; Soramäki
et al., 2007; Iori et al., 2008; Cajueiro et al., 2009; Bech and
Atalay, 2010; Fricke and Lux, 2014; Iori et al., 2015), but
also on the network of derivative exposures (Markose et al.,
2012; Markose, 2012). Research on financial multi-layer
networks that considers multiple channels of contagion, has
only appeared recently. Poledna et al. (2015) and León
et al. (2014) study the interactions of financial institutions
on different financial markets in Mexico and Colombia,
respectively.
To our knowledge, there exist only a few works that em-
pirically study the interrelationship between the financial
and the real economy. These studies focus on Japan and are
mainly concerned with the topology of credit networks be-
tween banks and large firms (Fujiwara et al., 2009; De Masi
and Gallegati, 2012; Aoyama, 2014; Marotta et al., 2015).
Additionally, De Masi et al. (2011) and Miranda and Tabak
(2013) study credit networks in Italy and Brazil, and Lux
(2016) develops a theoretical model of a bipartite credit
network between banks and the non-bank corporate sector.
De Masi et al. (2011) and De Masi and Gallegati (2012)
use network analysis to study the credit networks in Italy
and Japan and Fujiwara et al. (2009) and Marotta et al.
(2015) investigate the evolution of the network structure in
Japan. Marotta et al. (2015) further perform community
detection, identifying communities composed of both banks
and firms.
Miranda and Tabak (2013) and Aoyama (2014) make the
first attempt to empirically study systemic risk in credit
networks in Japan and Brazil. Aoyama (2014) uses Deb-
tRank to study risk propagation from banks to firms with
a dataset provided by Nikkei Inc. that contains approxi-
mately 2,000 firms and 200 banks in Japan, but does not
include interbank data. Miranda and Tabak (2013) per-
form the first study that includes interbank and firm loans.
However, the used dataset is relatively small and contains
only about 50 banks and 351 firms in Brazil.
In this work we extend the existing literature by recon-
structing and analyzing a large financial network that not
only includes all interbank liabilities but also nearly all
liabilities and deposits between banks and firms. We do
this by combing datasets that contain annual financial
statements of nearly all firms and banks in Austria (ap-
proximately 170, 000 firms and close to 1, 000 banks) with
anonymized interbank liabilities from the Austrian banking
system. The reconstruction of this large financial network
of firms and banks allows us to identify systemically impor-
tant firms by employing DebtRank to financial networks
as in Thurner and Poledna (2013). We estimate the share
of systemic risk introduced by firms and we compare the
systemic risk of the interbank network with the systemic
risk of the entire financial network consisting of firms and
banks. We show that the notion of systemically impor-
tant financial institutions (SIFIs) or global and domestic
systemically important banks (G-SIBs or D-SIBs) can be
straightforwardly extended to firms.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the datasets used in this study. In section 3 we
explain the methodology to reconstruct the entire financial
network. In sections 4 and 5 we present the results by first
presenting classical network statistics of the entire financial
network, followed by an analysis of systemic importance
of firms and banks. Finally, section 6 discusses the results
and provides conclusions.
2. Data
The data used for this analysis consists of two main parts,
annual financial statements of nearly all firms and banks
in Austria and anonymized interbank liabilities from the
Austrian banking system. Financial statements of firms are
taken from the SABINA database1, which provides infor-
mation on about 170, 000 firms in Austria. This database
contains company financials in a detailed format with up to
10 years of history, and additionally, data on shareholders
and subsidiaries, activity codes and trade descriptions, and
stock data for listed companies. The database includes
bank-firm relationships and allows us to identify which firm
is a customer of which bank.
Financial statements of banks are made publicly avail-
able by the Austrian Central Bank (OeNB)2. Interbank
data provided by the OeNB contains fully anonymized and
linearly transformed interbank liabilities from the entire
Austrian banking system over 12 consecutive quarters from
2006-2008. The dataset additionally includes total assets,
total liabilities, assets due from banks, liabilities due to
banks, and liquid assets (without interbank assets/liabili-
ties) for all banks, again in anonymized form.
There are 106, 919 firms and 796 banks that provided a fi-
nancial statement in the calendar year 2008. Figure 1 shows
a stacked bar chart of the different liabilities found in the
balance sheets filed in the calendar year 2008, aggregated
by the number of banks associated with each firm. In fig. 2
the number of banks associated with each firm is shown.
Approximately 48.6% of the firms representing about 80.2%
of total liabilities towards banks can be associated with
one or more banks. Firms that can not be associated with
a bank are excluded from the analysis. Since it is not
compulsory for small firms to provide an exact breakdown
of different liabilities, we estimate liabilities towards banks
with the average ratio of firms in the same line of business,
as indicated by their OeNACE code Wirtschaftskammer
Österreich (2008). We now reconstruct the liability net-
work of 796 banks and 51,980 firms representing 80.2% of
total liabilities towards banks by firms and all interbank
liabilities.
1The SABINA database is provided by Bureau van Dijk,
see https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-us/our-products/company-
information/national-products/sabina.
2https://www.oenb.at/jahresabschlusski/jahresabschlusski
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Figure 1: Types of different liabilities aggregated over the number of
banks associated with each firm. Data is obtained from the balance
sheets filed by each firm in the year 2008. Different liabilities are
sorted according to total volume in each type.
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Figure 2: Number of banks associated with each firm.
Figure 3: Illustration of a network of banks and firms . Con-
nections are either loans or deposits . Banks are connected to
firms and to each other, whereas firms only interact with banks.
3. Reconstruction of the liability network
We combined datasets from different sources to create
a network that represents the liabilities and assets of the
Austrian economy. The resulting bipartite network G =
(F,E) consists of two disjunct sets of nodes: banks B and
firms C, for which the following equations hold,
B ∪ C = F B ∩ C = ∅
|B| = b |C| = c .
The links either connect banks with other banks (in-
terbank liabilities), banks with firms (deposits of firms
at banks), or firms with banks (liabilities of firms). The
weighted adjacency matrix
Ln×n =
(
BBb×b BCb×c
CBc×b CCc×c = 0
)
, n = c+ b , (1)
is called the liability matrix, where each entry Lij indicates
the liability that node i (which is a bank if i ≤ b and a
firm if i > b) has to node j (the same applies here). It is
partitioned into the following four parts:
1. interbank network BB, connecting banks with banks,
2. bank-firm network BC, containing information about
deposits firms have at financial institutions,
3. firm-bank network CB, containing information about
liabilities firms have to financial institutions,
4. firm-firm network CC with inter-firm liabilities, omit-
ted in this work thus CCxy = 0 for all x, y ∈ [1, c].
The interbank network BB is taken directly from the
interbank dataset. Data on bank-firm relationships is used
to establish an unweighted bipartite network between firms
and banks. This bipartite network is used as a basis for
the BC and CB adjacency matrices, which are (after as-
signing weights, see below) combined with BB and padded
4with zeros to obtain the liability network L. To match
the interbank network BB with the bipartite bank-firm
networks BC and CB the banks of both datasets were
ranked according to total assets. The resulting tables were
then joined with their rank as common column.
The weights of the bipartite liability network of firms
and banks are assigned the following way:
• For every firm c, we take the aggregated liabilities Lc
the firm has toward banks from the balance sheet.
• We then take the set of aggregated loans (referred to
as assets, or Ai where i is the index of a bank/firm)
of all banks from their balance sheets and assign them
to the entries of the vector ` in the following way:
`b =
{
0 if Lcb = 0
Ab else
• We normalize the resulting vector with the L1 norm,
ˆ`= `∑
i |`i|
.
• We partition the aggregated liabilities with the distri-
bution ˆ`to obtain the entries for the firm-bank network
L:c = Lc · ˆ`.
Note that we partition the liabilities of each firm to the
banks to which it is connected to, according to the relative
size of the banks.
4. The liability network of Austria
We use empirical data (see section 2) to reconstruct
the liability network of Austria, as outlined in section 3.
The resulting network with 52,980 nodes is visualized in
fig. 4 and represents approximately 80.2% of total liabilities
towards banks of firms and all interbank liabilities3. Bank
nodes are represented by squares and firms by circles. Node
size corresponds to the total assets held by each node. For
the following analysis we chose the subgraph induced by
the set of all 796 banks in the Austrian banking system
and the 5,000 firms with the highest liabilities.
The degree distributions of the banks in the entire lia-
bility network and the interbank network are illustrated
in figs. 5 and 6. The in- and out-degree distributions are
depicted in fig. 5 for the entire liability network F , and
in fig. 6 for the interbank network B. In figs. 5 and 6 the
main plots show the whole range, the insets provide a finer
resolution in the ranges with higher density.
Table 1 shows the undirected and unweighted global
clustering coefficients 〈Ci〉 of the entire liability network
and the interbank network. Clustering coefficients are sig-
nificantly larger than the clustering coefficients of random
Figure 4: Reconstructed liability network of Austria with 796 bank
nodes and 51,980 firm nodes in 2008. The network represents
approximately 80.2% of total liabilities towards banks of firms and all
interbank liabilities. Node size corresponds to the total assets held
by each node.
Network Nodes Links 〈Ci〉 〈Ci〉rand
Entire network F 5,796 28,127 0.77 0.005
Interbank network B 796 12,783 0.89 0.043
Table 1: Number of nodes and links in the entire liability network
and in the interbank network. The undirected and unweighted global
clustering coefficient 〈Ci〉 of both networks and the global clustering
coefficient of a random graph with same number of nodes and links.
The random graph has considerable lower clustering as both networks.
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Figure 5: In- and out-degree of banks in the entire liability network F . Main plot has 60 uniform bins on the interval [0, 3000], the inset shows
the distribution of degrees in the range [0, 100].
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Figure 6: In- and out-degree of banks in the interbank network B. Main plot has 60 uniform bins on the interval [0, 360], the inset shows the
distribution of degrees in the range [0, 100].
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Figure 7: In- and out-degree of firms in the entire liability network.
Values are identical for all firms because loans and deposits (BC and
CB network, see section 3) use the same adjacency matrix, based on
the bank connections in the commercial register.
graphs with identical number of nodes and vertices 〈Ci〉rand,
as shown in table 1.
Figure 7 shows the degree distribution of firms in the
entire liability network (similar to fig. 2. The degree distri-
bution is restricted to firms with degree > 0 and contains
the 5,000 firms with the highest liabilities in 2008. Note
that the in- and out-degree for firms are identical, as the
bank connections provided to the commercial register were
used for both types of connections between firms and banks,
deposits and liabilities.
5. Systemically important firms and banks in Aus-
tria
To identify systemically important firms and banks we
use DebtRank. DebtRank was originally suggested as a
recursive method to determine the systemic relevance of
nodes within financial networks (Battiston et al., 2012).
It is a quantity that measures the fraction of the total
economic value V in the network that is potentially affected
by the distress of an individual node i, or by a set of nodes
S. For details see Appendix A.
Figure 8 shows all banks (squares) and firms (circles)
with a DebtRank RF ≥ 0.01. Node size represents the total
assets, whereas the color encodes the DebtRank. Nodes
with the highest DebtRanks are typically large banks with
substantial total assets, but there are also several nodes
with a high DebtRank that represent medium-sized banks
and firms. In particular, some medium-sized banks and
firms with total assets below 1 bln. EUR exist that have a
rather high DebtRank (≈ 0.4).
This can also be seen in fig. 9, which shows the DebtRank
values of firms and banks plotted against their total assets.
In general, firms as well as banks with larger assets tend
to have a higher DebtRank. However, firms with similar
DebtRank have differences in their total assets of multiple
3We used the network layout algorithm from Hu Yifan Hu (2006)
implementation in Gephi Bastian et al. (2009) to create the network
illustrations in this work.
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Figure 8: Subgraph of fig. 4 with nodes having a DebtRank
RF ≥ 0.01. Bank nodes are represented by squares and firms
by circles. Node size corresponds to the total assets held by each
node. Nodes are colored according to their DebtRank. Nodes rep-
resenting firms and banks with more assets tend to have a higher
DebtRank, but there are also several nodes with a high DebtRank
that represent medium-sized banks and firms.
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Figure 9: DebtRank of firms and banks plotted against their total
assets (as a proxy for firm size) in Euro. Firms with similar DebtRank
have differences in their asset sizes of multiple orders of magnitude.
Distribution of banks and firms do not seem to be qualitatively
different.
orders of magnitude. The distribution of banks and firms
does not seem to be qualitatively different.
In fig. 10 we show firms and banks in Austria ranked
according to their systemic importance measured by Deb-
tRank. Figure 10 shows the 45 banks [ ] and firms [ ]
with the highest DebtRanks, ranked by their DebtRank
in decreasing order from left to right. With the exception
of the three largest banks in Austria (see also fig. 8), the
distribution of banks and firms does not seem to be quali-
tatively different. For example, the highest DebtRank of a
firm in Austria is 0.39. Thus, a default of this firm would
affect 39% of the Austrian financial system.
Figure 11 shows the 45 firms with the highest DebtRank
and additionally provides information about their line of
business, according to the first level of their OeNACE
code (below the bars), a system to classify economic activ-
ities used in Austria Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (2008).
Clearly, systemically important firms are found in various
industries.
In fig. 12 the distribution of DebtRank values of firms
and banks (inset) is depicted with a histogram (70 bins and
range = [0, 0.7] in both cases). Again, banks and firms have
a qualitatively similar DebtRank-distribution. Apparently,
systemically important firms contribute systemic risk in a
similar way as banks.
Finally, we estimate the share of systemic risk introduced
by firms in the entire liability network. We define Q1 as
the ratio of the sum of the DebtRanks of all firms divided
by the sum of all DebtRanks in the entire liability network,
Q1 =
∑
i∈C R
F
i∑
i∈F R
F
i
. (2)
We find Q1 = 0.55 in Austria for 2008. Firms introduce
more than half of the systemic risk in the entire liability
network network (more than banks). To compare the
systemic risk of the interbank network with the systemic
risk of the entire liability network we define a similar ratio
Q2 =
V B
∑
i∈B R
B
i
V F
∑
i∈F R
F
i
, (3)
where V B and V F refer to the total economic values of the
interbank network and the entire liability network, respec-
tively. In this case we must take the different economic
value of the two networks into account, since the DebtRank
is a relative measure. We find Q2 = 0.29 in Austria for
2008, i.e. the total systemic risk of the interbank network
amounts to only 29% of the total systemic risk of the entire
liability network.
6. Conclusions
Systemic importance of financial institutions is related
to the topology of financial networks to a large extent. In
this work we reconstruct and analyze the to our knowl-
edge largest financial network that has been studied up to
now. This financial network consists of 51,980 firms and
796 banks representing 80.2% of total liabilities towards
banks by firms and all interbank liabilities from the entire
Austrian banking system visualized in fig. 4.
We find that firms induce systemic risk in a similar way
as banks. Banks and firms have a qualitatively similar
distribution of systemic importance (see fig. 12). In par-
ticular, we identify several medium-sized banks and firms
with total assets below 1 bln. EUR in Austria that are
systemically important in the entire financial network. Sys-
temic importance of these firms is primarily driven by their
position in the network. Moreover, these firms belong to
various industries (fig. 11). We further find that banks and
firms of similar systemic importance have differences in
their asset sizes of multiple orders of magnitude (fig. 9).
Our main result is that, overall, firms introduce slightly
more systemic risk than banks and that in Austria for the
year 2008 the total systemic risk of the interbank network
amounts to only 29% of the total systemic risk of the entire
financial network consisting of firms and banks.
These results come with three caveats due to partially
missing and partly inaccurate data. First of all, the ana-
lyzed financial network is reconstructed and not directly
taken from empirical data. However, the reconstruction
process only involves reconstructing the weights from the
(unweighted) adjacency matrix, which is directly taken
from empirical data. Moreover, for a large subset of firms,
the liabilities towards banks (42.4% of total liabilities to-
wards banks) are known exactly and do not need to be
reconstructed since these firms are only customers of one
bank (fig. 2). The interbank liabilities are also not recon-
structed. Second, interbank liabilities from the Austrian
banking system are fully anonymized and linearly trans-
formed. Thus, there is a small uncertainty in the absolute
value of the interbank liabilities, which also introduces
some uncertainty in the matching process of the various
datasets and third, our analysis involves only one snapshot
of the Austrian financial system in 2008 – the only year,
where the necessary datasets overlap.
It would be interesting to extend this study to other
countries and to investigate the evolution of similar large
financial networks that consist of firms and banks and
represent interbank liabilities and the liabilities towards
banks by firms. It would further be interesting to go beyond
the scope of this work and study a financial network that
truly represents all liabilities between all economic agents
from all sectors (households, non-financial and financial
firms and the government sector) in an entire national
economy.
Though further investigation might be necessary to con-
firm our findings for other countries and over longer time
horizons, we believe that this contribution is a valuable
first comprehensive quantification of the financial interrela-
tionships between the financial and the real economy. We
show that the notion of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs) or global and domestic systemically
important banks (G-SIBs or D-SIBs) can be straightfor-
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Figure 10: DebtRanks of 45 firms and banks sorted by their DebtRank from left to right in decreasing order. With the exception of the three
largest banks in Austria (see also fig. 8), the distribution of banks and firms does not seem to be qualitatively different.
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Figure 11: Firms in different economic sectors ranked by DebtRank (in descending order). The colors correspond to the economic sector in
which the firms operate, according to the first level of their OeNACE classification (also used as x-axis label).
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Figure 12: Histogram of DebtRanks RF in the entire liability network of banks [ ] and firms [ ]. Banks and firms have a qualitatively
similar DebtRank-distribution. The highest DebtRank of a firm is 0.39.
wardly extended to firms. In particular, we identify several
medium-sized banks and firms with total assets below 1
bln. EUR in Austria that are systemically important. In
conclusion, our analysis suggests that not only systemi-
cally important financial institutions but also systemically
important firms must be subject to macro-prudential regu-
lation.
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Appendix A. DebtRank
The financial dependencies of the nodes in the network
are given in a liability matrix L with entries Lij denoting
that node j has given node i a loan (or investment/deposit)
of size Lij . Additionally, there is a capital (or equity)
vector C with entries Ci denoting the capital of node i.
The relative economic value of a node i is given by
vi =
Li∑
j Lj
(A.1)
where Li =
∑
j Lji is the sum of the outstanding liabilities
of node i.
The default of node i then affects all nodes j where
Lij > 0. The impact of the default of i on j is defined as
Wij = min
(
Lij
Cj
, 1
)
. (A.2)
The impact of a shock is thus measured as the fraction
of capital loss due to the credit default. It is therefore a
value in the range [0, 1] with the semantics Wij = 0 if the
default of node i does not affect node j, and Wij = 1 if the
default of node i results in a loss that matches or exceeds
the capital of node j.
The economic value of the impact is obtained by multi-
plying the impact with the relative economic value from
eq. (A.1). The economic value of the impact of i on its
neighbors is therefore given by
Ii =
∑
j
Wijvj (A.3)
Though if the neighbors of i do not have enough capital
to compensate for the default of i, they default themselves,
leading to an impact on their neighbors and reverberations
in the network along paths in the impact network W . To
prevent infinite cycles, Battiston et al. proposed to only
take walks without repeating links. This is achieved by
introducing two additional state variables for each node, si
and hi (both dependent on the time step t). The variable
si takes one of three values:
si(t) Interpretation
U Node i is undistressed at time t
D Node i is in distress at time t
I Node i is inactive at time t
The variable hi has a value in the range [0, 1] and is the
level of distress, with 0 meaning undistressed and hi(t) = 1
in the case of default. The value of hi(t) is defined as
hi(t) = min
1, hi(t− 1) + ∑
j|sj(t−1)=D
Wjihj(t1)
 ,
(A.4)
whereas si(t) is given by:
si(t) =

D if hi(t) > 0 ∧ si(t− 1) , I,
I if si(t− 1) = D,
si(t− 1) otherwise
(A.5)
To calculate the DebtRank of a node d (d for defaulting),
the distress hi and status si at time step t = 1 are initialized
as follows:
hi(1) =
{
1 if i = d
0 otherwise
(A.6)
si(1) =
{
D if i = d
U otherwise.
. (A.7)
Then the values of si and hi are calculated for every node
i and time step t, according to eqs. (A.4) and (A.5) until
all nodes are either inactive or undistressed at t = T . The
DebtRank of node d can then be calculated as the sum of
the distress in the whole network at time t = T reduced
by the distress at the beginning, i.e. the initial distress of
node d at t = 1:
Rd =
∑
i
hi(T )vi − hd(1)vd. (A.8)
It would be possible to calculate the combined DebtRank
of a set S of simultaneously defaulting nodes by replacing
the i = d conditions in the initialization (eq. (A.7)) by i ∈ S
and changing eq. (A.8) to one of the following equations:
RS =
∑
i
hi(T )vi −
∑
d∈S
hd(1)vd (A.9)
RS =
∑
i
hi(T )vi . (A.10)
Equation (A.9) excludes the impact of the initial shock,
whereas eq. (A.10) does not.
In this work, DebtRank is calculated on two different
networks, the interbank network B and the entire liability
network F . We use RF and RB to discern between the
two measures.
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